In Bacon's follow-up paper, RedargutioPhilosophiarum, he carries on his empiricist project by referringto the doctrine of twofold truth, while in De Principiis atqueOriginibus he rejects alchemical theories concerning thetransformation of substances in favor of Greek atomism. But in the sametext he sharply criticizes his contemporary Telesio for propagating anon-experimental halfway house empiricism. Though Telesio proves to bea moderate ‘modern’, he clings to the Aristotelianframework by continuing to believe in the quinta essentia andin the doctrine of the two worlds, which presupposes two modes ofnatural law (one mode for the sublunary and another for the superlunarysphere).
Although Aristotle provided specific axioms for every scientificdiscipline, what Bacon found lacking in the Greek philosopher'swork was a master principle or general theory of science, which couldbe applied to all branches of natural history and philosophy (Klein2003a). For Bacon, Aristotle's cosmology, as well as his theoryof science, had become obsolete and consequently so too had many of themedieval thinkers who followed his lead. He does not repudiateAristotle completely, but he opposes the humanistic interpretation ofhim, with its emphasis on syllogism and dialectics (scientiaoperativa versus textual hermeneutics) and the metaphysicaltreatment of natural philosophy in favor of natural forms (ornature's effects as structured modes of action, not artifacts),the stages of which correspond—in the shape of a pyramid ofknowledge—to the structural order of nature itself.
And then, it is necessary that we should take in view other labors which dignified Bacon’s retirement, as well as those which marked his more active career as a lawyer and statesman,–his histories and biographies, as well as learned treatises to improve the laws of England; his political discourses, his judicial charges, his theological tracts, his speeches and letters and prayers; all of which had relation to benefit others rather than himself. Who has ever done more to instruct the world,–to enable men to rise not in fortune merely, but in virtue and patriotism, in those things which are of themselves the only reward? We should consider these labors, as well as the new method he taught to arrive at knowledge, in our estimate of the sage as well as of the man. He was a moral philosopher, like Socrates. He even soared into the realm of supposititious truth, like Plato. He observed Nature, like Aristotle. He took away the syllogism from Thomas Aquinas,–not to throw contempt on metaphysical inquiry or dialectical reasoning, but to arrive by a better method at the knowledge of first principles; which once established, he allowed deductions to be drawn from them, leading to other truths as certainly as induction itself. Yea, he was also a Moses on the mount of Pisgah, from which with prophetic eye he could survey the promised land of indefinite wealth and boundless material prosperity, which he was not permitted to enter, but which he had bequeathed to civilization. This may have been his greatest gift in the view of scientific men,–this inductive process of reasoning, by which great discoveries have been made after he was dead. But this was not his only legacy, for other things which he taught were as valuable, not merely in his sight, but to the eye of enlightened reason. There are other truths besides those of physical science; there is greatness in deduction as well as in induction. Geometry–whose successive and progressive revelations are so inspiring, and which, have come down to us from a remote antiquity, which are even now taught in our modern schools as Euclid demonstrated them, since they cannot be improved–is a purely deductive science. The scholastic philosophy, even if it was barren and unfruitful in leading to new truths, yet confirmed what was valuable in the old systems, and by the severity of its logic and its dialectical subtleties trained the European mind for the reception of the message of Luther and Bacon; and this was based on deductions, never wrong unless the premises are unsound. Theology is deductive reasoning from truths assumed to be fundamental, and is inductive only so far as it collates Scripture declarations, and interprets their meaning by the aid which learning brings. Is not this science worthy of some regard? Will it not live when all the speculations of evolutionists are forgotten, and occupy the thoughts of the greatest and profoundest minds so long as anything shall be studied, so long as the Bible shall be the guide of life? Is it not by deduction that we ascend from Nature herself to the God of Nature? What is more certain than deduction when the principles from which it reasons are indisputably established?
Bacon's theory of active or even vivid force in matter accounts forwhat he calls Cupid in De Principiis atque Originibus (BaconV , 463–5). Since his theory of matter aims at anexplanation of the reality which is the substratum of appearances, hedigs deeper than did the mechanistic physics of the 17thcentury (Gaukroger 2001, 132–7). Bacon's ideas concerningthe quid facti of reality presuppose the distinction
Bacon's speculative system is a hybrid based on different sourceswhich provided him with seminal ideas: e.g., atomism, Aristotelianism,Arabic astronomy, Copernican theory, Galileo's discoveries, the worksof Paracelsus, and Gilbert. In his theory he combines astronomy,referring to Alpetragius (see Dijksterhuis 1956, 237–43; Reesand Upton 1984, 26; Gaukroger, 2001, 172–5; and see Grant1994, 533–66, for discussion of the cosmology of Alpetragius),and chemistry (Rees 1975a, 84–5):
Named after the School’s founder, Dame Frances Dove, the Dove Award is a service-oriented scheme for all LIV girls. Girls participate in a diverse range of challenges from research, personal achievement targets and assisting a charitable enterprise to undertaking a survival exercise and a night spent camping in the School grounds. Successful completion of the Award prepares girls for participation in The Duke of Edinburgh’s Award programme.
In Bacon's thought we encounter a relation between science andsocial philosophy, since his ideas concerning a utopian transformationof society presuppose an integration into the social framework of hisprogram concerning natural philosophy and technology as the two formsof the maker's knowledge. From his point of view, which wasinfluenced by Puritan conceptions, early modern society has to makesure that losses caused by the Fall are compensated for, primarily byman's enlargement of knowledge, providing the preconditions for anew form of society which combines scientia nova andthe millennium, according to the prophecy of Daniel 12:4 (Hill 1971,85–130). Science as a social endeavor is seen as a collectiveproject for the improvement of social structures. On the other hand, astrong collective spirit in society may function as a conditio sinequa non for reforming natural philosophy. Bacon's famousargument that it is wise not to confound the Book of Nature with theBook of God comes into focus, since the latter deals with God'swill (inscrutable for man) and the former with God's work, thescientific explanation or appreciation of which is a form of Christiandivine service. Successful operations in natural philosophy andtechnology help to improve the human lot in a way which makes thehardships of life after the Fall obsolete. It is important to note thatBacon's idea of a—to a certain extent—Christiansociety by no means conveys Christian pessimism in the vein ofpatristic thinkers but rather displays a clear optimism as the resultof compounding the problem of truth with the scope of human freedom andsovereignty (Brandt 1979, 21).
Historians of science, with their predilection for mathematicalphysics, used to criticize Bacon's approach, stating that“the Baconian concept of science, as an inductive science, hasnothing to do with and even contradicts today's form ofscience” (Malherbe 1996, 75). In reaching this verdict, however,they overlooked the fact that a natural philosophy based on a theory ofmatter cannot be assessed on the grounds of a natural philosophy orscience based on mechanics as the fundamental discipline. One canaccount for this chronic mode of misunderstanding as a specimen of theparadigmatic fallacy (Gaukroger 2001, 134ff.; see Rees 1986).
In the UVI pupils explore two key art historical periods in depth, developing their own research skills and using critical texts. ‘Invention and illusion: The Renaissance in Italy (1420-1520)’ explores a period of extraordinary artistic achievement focusing on artists/architects such as Botticelli, Brunelleschi, Donatello, Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael and Michelangelo. ‘Power and persuasion: The Baroque in Catholic Europe (1597-1685)’ investigates the artistic response to the political and religious turmoil of age in the Italian states, France, Spain and the Spanish Netherlands through the works of artists such as Caravaggio, Rubens, Velazquez, Bernini and Poussin.
The LVI course begins by developing the core skills of visual analysis, allowing girls to use technical terminology and identify the formal features of any painting, sculpture or building they encounter. Two themes are then explored; ‘Identities in Art and Architecture’ and ‘Nature in Art and Architecture’. The first considers how art and architecture have been used to express identity, be it status, character, gender, nationality or ethnicity. Artists studied include Jan van Eyck, Rembrandt, Grayson Perry, Frida Kahlo and Vincent van Gogh. The second theme looks at how nature has provided a source of inspiration in art and architecture and how natural materials have been used across time and place. Artists studied include J.M.W. Turner, Claude Monet, Henry Moore, Hokusai, Antoni Gaudi, Frank Lloyd Wright and Georgia O’Keeffe.